Play, among its many and varied meanings, may denote a type of structural dynamics, a being at once of two minds or a holding at once of mutually exclusive positions. Play as this sort of structurality, to use Jacques Derrida's term, offers insight and promise for creatively engaging the challenges of the modern academic study of religion.

Religion is a generic category imagined and developed to address issues distinctive to a Western heritage. That the study of religion be academic requires it to be descriptive, its scope to be world-wide and spanning history, its methods to be comparative, and its goal to be comprehension and appreciation rather than conversion. That the study of religion be modern demands it to embrace cultural and religious diversity without the principal intent to collapse difference. That the study of religion be postmodern demands it to forgo (or at least to persistently acknowledge the impact of) objectivist and essentialist premises and to embrace the responsibility for creating and constructing its subjects as well as discovering and observing them. Thus the academic study of religion finds itself repudiating aspects of both its religious and intellectual heritages (inseparable from Western religious ideas) and, even more seriously, challenging its own most fundamental understanding of its subject, religion (based heavily on the prototype of Christianity). The acknowledgment that there is no being-presence, no essential ground, it would seem, contradicts most religious views of the world, the views of our subjects. The acceptance of diverse world-views—some exclusive, most claiming ultimate truth—does the same.

Frankly, I find this conundrum one of the most interesting issues facing the academic study of religion. It is what can make this field of study important to the academy and to the world beyond. Our challenge is to find a meaningful way to hold together at once two or more irreconcilable positions and to do so without smoke and mirrors and without forced or too easy difference-denying.
solutions. Our ability to do this is among the crowning human capabilities. That this ability, which may be called “play,” is a common one at the root of so much human pleasure and so many aspects of human culture—symbol, metaphor, language, humor, art and religion—is all the more satisfying.

Play emerges early in human development. Jean Piaget described the dynamics of human development in terms of two strategies: accommodation and assimilation. Accommodation is when the child holds the experience of the world as the base on which to develop and adjust concepts and ideas, that is, knowledge and awareness of the real world. Assimilation (the term “projection” may communicate the idea more directly) is a complementary strategy in which the developing child builds a sense of self (ego) by projecting her or his ideas on the world. The first is necessary to accommodate the facticity and independent existence of the world in which we live (reality) while the second is necessary to relate meaningfully as individual human beings through such operations as imagination and interpretation and it is required for all forms of human expression from language to art (ego). Piaget, and later Erik Erikson, saw these strategies as interdependent rather than separable. While they structurally oppose one another, they are necessarily held in common in developing human beings through a structurality Piaget referred to as play which he understood as “distinguished by a modification, varying in degree, of the conditions of equilibrium between reality and ego... Play is to be conceived as being both related to adapted thought by a continuous sequence of intermediaries, and bound up with thought as a whole, of which it is only one pole, more or less differentiated” (Piaget 1962: 150).

This understanding of play as a kind of structural dynamics was presented as early as the late eighteenth century by Friedrich Schiller in On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1967 [1795]). He described play as a human drive (Spieltrieb). Schiller investigated the distinctions of being human in terms of a series of opposing pairs of drives or forces (Trieb). For example, he recognized two contrary “challenges to man,” which he called the sensuous and formal drives. The sensuous drive insists on attention to the present and the wholly subjective. All potentialities are fully manifest. The formal drive, on the other hand, strives toward universality, generality and law. Seen as the product of these drives, human beings externalize all that is within them and give form to all that is outside them (Schiller 1967: XIV.1). While these forces oppose one another, Schiller found neither impulse to be dispensable. It is not a matter of choosing between them, because when either acts exclusive of the other the result is the loss of the human being: the sensuous drive acting alone leaves the person as a moment of sensation while one becomes an idea, a species, when only the formal drive is active. Further, both drives require restriction and moderation. “Perfection,” in Schiller’s scheme, is attained only through “a reciprocal action between the two drives, reciprocal action of such a kind that the activity of the one both gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the other, and in which each in itself achieves its highest manifestation precisely by reason of the other being active” (Schiller 1967: XIV.1). When both drives work “in concert,” the reciprocal action amounts to the emergence of a third drive, the play drive (Spieltrieb). According to Schiller this play drive is “directed towards annulment in time within time (the contribution of the sensuous drive), reconciling becoming with absolute being and change with identity (the contribution of the formal drive) ... The play-drive, in consequence, as the one in which both the others act in concert, will eject upon the psyche at once a moral and physical constraint; it will, therefore, since it annuls all contingency, annul all constraint too, and set man free both physically and morally” (Schiller 1967: XIV.3 and 5). The interaction and movement among the two opposed mutually exclusive forces—that is, in the interplay of the drives—achieve a kind of transcendence (play) of the opposing drives that Schiller identified with freedom, with perfection and with beauty. Though two centuries old, Schiller’s view of play in some ways anticipates postmodernity where play is an important concept.

Near the end of his essay, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Jacques Derrida places his readers in the jaws of the alternative approaches to interpretation. He writes in typical Derridian style:

There are two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play [jeu]. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering, a truth or an origin which is free from play and from the order of the sign, and lives like an exile the necessity of interpretation. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name man being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or ofontotheology—in other words, through the history of all his history—has dreamed of full presence, of reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of the game. (Derrida 1970: 264)

Derrida holds the choice to be trivial, writing that we must “first try to conceive of the common ground, and the difference of this irreducible difference” (Derrida 1970: 265). That is, we must play both irreconcilable options at once and in doing so transcend to a new level of awareness of structural dynamics. In Derrida’s terms play is of structurality rather than of structure (that limits play). Play emerges from the rupture he identified with Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, with Freud’s critique of self-presence, and with Heidegger’s destruction of the determination of being as presence. Play is born of the loss of center, of fixedness, of the awareness of “a field of infinite substitutions in the closure of a finite ensemble” (Derrida 1970: 249). This is, of course, the domain of the sign.

In “A Theory of Play and Fantasy,” the essay that has in recent years replaced Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens4 as the standard defining work on play, Gregory Bateson focuses his attention on the meta-communicative aspects
of play, recognizing that play is possible only if the participating organisms are capable of some degree of meta-communication. Play, in his analysis, always contains the message "this is play" rather than that which without this meta-communication would be considered something else. Observing monkeys playing, Bateson realized that their playful nips denoted bites, but still they did not denote what would be denoted by bites. Thus he saw that play could be described as a meta-message: "These actions, in which we now engage, do not denote what would be denoted by those actions which these actions denote." In other words, the actions must be framed by the meta-message "this is play." The statement "this is play," as Bateson analyzes it, establishes "a paradoxical frame comparable to Epimenides' paradox" (Bateson 1972: 184). Epimenides, the Cretan, stated that all Cretans are liars. This is a self-referential paradox. If his statement is true, then it is false; if false, then it falsifies itself. "This is play" allows the holding at once of the statements "this action denotes something" and "this action does not denote what these actions denote."

Bateson's work focused attention on the interplay between play and the boundary that distinguished play from not-play. Choices made within play, unlike those in not-play, necessarily invoke the interrelationship of the content of play with the boundary condition "this is play." Play is moebian in this sense: the inside and outside are so seamlessly connected as to be self-problematic. To play is also in one sense to say, "this is play" which is also in one sense to ask, "what is play?" Play is a boundary that presents alternatives governed by self-contradiction such that each leads to and negates the other in an apparent endless cycle. Play demands choice among equally valued alternatives. Choice depends upon a hierarchy of values. Choice involves movement. But when any choice is made (thus seemingly to pass beyond play) the immediate attractiveness of the not chosen alternative invokes self-doubt and self-reflection on and problematization of the hierarchy of values which led to the now-questioned choice. And on and on. The result is an oscillatory movement in at least two planes—the movement back and forth among alternatives within the frame of play seeking resolution through choice and the movement back and forth between the domain in which choice is demanded and the boundary conditions that frame the choices (see Handelman 1992). I believe play is often experienced as enjoyable because it celebrates the distinctive human capacity to simultaneously do one thing and its opposite and to be aware of the process by which it is possible to do the impossible. Yet, seen in this way, we can also appreciate why play is often opposed to work (where choices are experienced as satisfying terminations) and that play may be experienced as frustrating or dangerous.

The experience of play is autotelic—what Csikszentmihalyi (1990) calls "flow"—because its self-referential and paradoxical character challenges one to do all of the following at once: to make choices, to reflect on the process of making choices, and to question our understanding of how choices are made. It is autotelic because it challenges us to end that which turns endlessly upon itself. To attempt to end play by making a choice only initiates a new cycle of play and often at a new level.

Interestingly, Jean Baudrillard's understanding of the way our brains work is similar:

There is no better model of the way in which the computer screen and the mental screen of our own brain are interwoven than Moebius's topology, with its peculiar contiguity of near and far, inside and outside, subject and object within the same spiral. It is in accordance with this same model that the information and communication are constantly turning round themselves in an incessuous circulation, a superficial conflation of subject and object, within and without, question and answer, event and image and so on. The form is inevitably that of a twisted ring reminiscent of the mathematical symbol for infinity. (Baudrillard 1993: 36)

The academic study of religion may be clarified by rethinking it sub specie ludi. In my view, Jonathan Z. Smith offers the best foundation for this development. Fundamental to understanding this aspect of his work is to discern the playful character of the academic method by which Smith conducts his work. Juxtaposition is his initiating operation. He places side by side interpretations, quotations and their sources, approaches or ideas in such a way that they demand comparison. An engaging juxtaposition motivates an interplay, rather than a resolution, among the elements. That interplay is fueled by difference, because it is in difference that the operation is interesting and creative. If the elements can be happily reduced to sameness, the process abruptly ends. Play stops. Difference gives rise to thought, to hypothesis and theory, to explanation. Smith's is a comparative method framed by juxtaposition and fueled by difference directed less toward final resolution than toward raising questions and revealing insights. Smith's method is akin to play as described above.

The structure we are calling play is evident in Smith's understanding of the categories he, and many others, hold most fundamentally religious: place, myth and ritual. Place, for Smith, is accounted for most powerfully in the dynamics of map and territory. He recognizes religion as well as the study of religion as a mapping process and to account for the history of the study of religions he articulates two mapping strategies—locative and utopian. A locative vision of the world emphasizes place, while a utopian vision emphasizes the value of being in no place (J. Z. Smith 1978a: 101). But Smith warns against using this distinction as a pair of categories into which to sort religions. The structurality of play is engaged here by Smith in a powerful construction that builds upon the acknowledgment of the interdependence of these two mapping strategies as well as the classical terms of sacred and profane (chaos in Smith's revision). In acknowledging the power of the incongruity and difference that forces the elements of these pairs to be held
together, despite their opposition. Smith articulates a third, yet unnamed, mapping strategy found in some traditions that are more closely akin to the joke in that they neither deny nor flee from disjunction, but allow the incongruous elements to stand. They suggest that symbolism, myth, ritual, repetition, transcendence are all incapable of overcoming disjunction. They seek, rather, to play between the incongruities and to provide an occasion for thought” (J. Z. Smith 1978: 309). Here again is a “third thing” arising from the dynamic interplay among two juxtaposed and opposed elements. Though Smith here identifies this strategy as a third category of religious traditions, it is clear from the study of his work that it may be understood as more pervasive and fundamental than a minor category. It can be shown that this third strategy corresponds with his understanding of both religion and the academic study of religion as species of play (see S. D. Gill 1998a).

Smith shows us that religion arises in and exists because of the play of difference which he repeatedly demonstrates in his studies of myth and ritual. For Smith, myth is a story concocted and told to deal with a situation. Myth is always applied and its distinctive character is the dynamic process of relating the story to an existential situation. Smith writes:

There is delight and there is play in both the “fit” and the incongruity of the “fit,” between an element in the myth and this or that segment of the world that one has encountered. Myth, properly understood, must take into account the complex processes of application and inapplicability, of congruity and incongruity. Myth shares with other genres such as the joke, the riddle and the “gospel” a perception of a possible relation between two different “things” and it delights in the play in-between. (J. Z. Smith 1978a: 206)

For Smith the power of myth is located in the play that arises in the process of application, in the oscillation between “fit” and “no fit,” rather than the resolution of “fit” (see also J. Z. Smith 1978a: 300). For Smith, myth is best understood as a species of play.

Smith’s understanding of ritual is not a simple translation from story to action. In Smith’s presentation, which itself creates and plays among incongruities, ritual is a controlled environment that resolves incongruities that commonly exist in the course of life and thus contrasts with myth:

Ritual represents the creation of a controlled environment where the variables (i.e., the accidents) of ordinary life may be displaced precisely because they are felt to be so overwhelmingly present and powerful. Ritual is a means of performing the way things ought to be in conscious tension to the way things are in such a way that this ritualized perfection is recollected in the ordinary, uncontrolled, course of things. (J. Z. Smith 1982c: 63; emphasis in original)

Like his view of myth, Smith sees ritual as serving practical purposes, as existing only in application, only in meeting the needs of historical and cultural situations. Whereas myth offers a perspective on an existential situation creating a gap that cannot be overcome, thus initiating a play that gives rise to meaning, ritual is itself motivated by existing incongruities that, in the course of life, can never be overcome. Ritual thus appears to lean towards a locative strategy. But, particularly in his study of ritual in To Take Place, Smith makes it clear that ritual also has its creativity and power in its ability to provide occasion for reflection. In his discussion of Indic sacrificial ritual Smith writes:

Ritual is a relationship of differences between “nows”—the now of everyday life and the now of ritual place; the simultaneity, but not the coexistence, of “here” and “there.” . . . The absolute discrepancy invites thought, but cannot be thought away. One is invited to think of the potentialities of the one “now” in terms of the other; but the one cannot become the other. Ritual precisest ambiguities; it neither overcomes nor relaxes them. (J. Z. Smith 1987b: 110)

And a clearer description of play structurality would be difficult to find.

Though elsewhere (S. D. Gill 1998a) I have discussed more fully J. Z. Smith’s study of religion in terms of play, there is one other aspect of his work that must be considered here and that is his widely known statement “map is not territory” which titles his perhaps best known essay as well as a collection of his essays. Smith concludes his essay “Map is Not Territory” (J. Z. Smith 1978a: 289-309) with the rather problematic statement, “We [academics] need to reflect on and play with the necessary incongruity of our maps before we set out on a voyage of discovery to chart the worlds of other men. For the dictum of Alfred Korzybski is inescapable: ‘Map is not territory’—but maps are all we possess” (J. Z. Smith 1978a: 309). It is important to try to understand what Smith means here. Smith’s statement seems motivated by the scholarly voyage that takes us to the world occupied by “other” people, a real world presumably and one independent of us. While Smith reminds us that our maps are not equivalent to the worlds of others, reminding us that they are (I presume) interpretations, he concludes with the conundrum “but maps are all we possess.” I believe that Smith is reminding us here that we do not have, in any significant way, access to the actual worlds or realities of others, except as they are presented in texts. He sees religion as primarily confined to the analysis and interpretation of texts. The conundrum is not resolved in that Smith still acknowledges this real world of the other as ultimately our subject. And in another place he writes that “it is both wonderful and unaccountable, perhaps even comic or crazy, that sometimes our playful imagination, our arguments about and mental construals of the world, turn out to have real consequences” (J. Z. Smith 1978b: 18). We find here, as in his view of ritual, a multi-level complex of playful juxtapositions.
I think this conundrum might now be further enriched. Scholarship is at once a construcor, an interpretation, to meet the interests of the academy and it has "real consequences." There is an interplay between reality and our study of it. This playful act of imagination is clearly in line with the mocosbiatic thought articulated by Jean Baudrillard in Simulacra and Simulation (1994). We must recognize that our construals may be but preceding simulacra of our subject reality, that is, projections made without adequate constraint, amounting to the construction (fabrication) of our subject. When scholarship shapes the world to correspond with our academic mappings of it, Korzybski's statement is shifted to "map is now territory." Though we have the most tenuous access to the reality we study, our studies often significantly shape these actual realities. These issues raised with respect to the academic study of religion make us unsure of where we stand to perform our tasks and Smith boldly proclaims that there is no place on which we might stand firmly and without reservation. To take a stance in this complex world without recognizing that it is problematic is either religious, narrow-minded or naive. Yet to refuse to take any stand at all puts us out of business, it renders us silent. But this issue takes us back to where I began this essay. Now we might recognize that what I have described, based on the analysis of a variety of scholars, as play, a particular kind of structurality, is central to Jonathan Smith's understanding of religion, the academic study of religion, and it characterizes his academic methods. One hope for the future of the academic study of religion, one which acknowledges and works with the complex contemporary world, is to practice it sub specie ludi.

What remains is to consider what a study of religion might look like if conducted in the terms of play. Though J. Z. Smith has yet to systematically present his studies explicitly in the terms of play, his scholarship offers both a model and the foundation for development of a study of religion in terms of play.

As a constructed generic category religion is itself of a meta-language that makes possible some general comprehension and discourse about an aspect of being human and about human cultures. The academic study of religion has a play structurality in that doing it always also involves the meta-message "this is academic not religious"—to be "religious" would be to identify with one of the alternative positions that engage the academic study of religion and would therefore negate any possibility of being engaged by the play structurality—signaling a passage through a boundary of paradox very like that of play. The study of religion as play juxtaposes alternatives that demand comparison but defy resolution. This oscillatory activity gives rise to another dimension of concern, the juxtaposition of the items compared and the constructed academic categories involved. In other words, the interpretive study of any particular cultural practice cannot be done without also raising issues of the categories and theories in which it is framed, and this cannot be grasped without comparison with the practices of other religions. The experience of this play structurality engages movement between the content (alternative religions, etc.) and the boundary (the academic study and all of its constructs) raising questions such as "what is religion?" (see also S. D. Gill 1998b: esp. chs. 2 and 3).

This does not mean that specific religions or our understanding of religion need exclude play. J. Z. Smith has convincingly shown that the meaning and vitality of place, myth and ritual (all of these are academically constructed analytic categories) is a result of the play of fit. Religion and its constituents, as Smith imagines them, involve the oscillatory and iterative negotiation of fit without final resolution. But the academic study of religion, while framing different concerns than do religions, gains its meaning and vitality through the same process.

Many of the frequently-considered problems related to how our subjects understand what we are doing are clarified by a play approach to the academic study of religion. This academic study arises out of a Western intellectual and cultural heritage and is meaningful primarily in these terms. The proposition is that academic studies of the whole world—a task demanding the concoction and development of abstract generic comparative categories, categories not necessarily present to our subjects—effectively addresses the concerns that have arisen in our own tradition. To expect our subjects either to agree with, be interested in, or to even comprehend our business is, it seems to me, an undesirable recent phase of our own colonization and missionization. Though this view does not deny our responsibility to them, indeed, quite the opposite. It is in the juxtaposition and comparison (of the type that acknowledges both sameness and unresolvable difference) of others that our subjects are brought into juxtaposition with our constructed categories, ideas and theories. The academic study of religion is mocosbiatic and Janus-like in structure. As it attempts to understand others in their own terms, it cannot help but recognize that our results are powerfully determined by our expectations. To avoid madness (and bad scholarship) we must see this process in terms of play.

This play approach to the study of religion encourages an interactive model of interpretation requiring the interplay of ego and reality, the interplay between interpreter and the independent subject that is interpreted. In the academic study of religion I think far too little attention has been given to the technical aspects of interpretation. We have not really known how to interpret or to evaluate a legitimate and satisfying interpretation. An interactive interpretation is completely free to re-ontologize reality in terms of the perspectives of the interpreter, but it must also be constrained by the real and independent subject (see S. D. Gill 1998b: esp. ch. 2).

The academic study of religion is then in some important sense like the creation of engaging narratives in which we tell the tales of the religions of "other" people. Our writings are fictive in the sense both of being about those
we are not (they are beyond our full comprehension) and are motivated to address issues of our own making. We make and tell our tales in the attempt to live morally and meaningfully as modern (should I say postmodern?) citizens of a complex and diverse world. It is a peculiar necessity, a defining principle, that our tales lay aside the role of discovering Truth, of reporting objective reality. While we tell tales of how "other" people come to Truth and to understand how it shapes their lives, we must acknowledge that doing so (and doing so seriously) forces us to set aside or qualify any claim to the truth of what we are doing. But we are constrained in an important way not experienced by other storytellers—novelists, for example—whose genres are distinguished as hyper-realities. We tell the tales of real people and we must not shirk the responsibility of being constrained by the fact of their existence. We cannot go about our task assuming that what we do does not affect the real worlds of the actual people that give inspiration to our tales. The greatest absurdity in what we do is that, because our knowledge is always in some respects a product of our theories, we can never objectively know those whom we choose as our subjects, but we are nonetheless always in interaction with them, as partners in a dance. Our stories cannot exist without our real subjects. We must acknowledge that our writings are fictive, in that they are the products of our theoretical perspectives, and we must constrain these fictions by the real and independent presence of others. The academic study of religion sub specie ludi embraces this paradox oscillating playfully among the irreconcilable alternatives, knowing that doing so also gives rise to the play between the studies of our subjects and the paradox-creating frame in which we work. What we write then is hyper-real, but it must also be real. Hyper-real, on the one hand, in that it is distinguished by imaginative academics creating stories, arguing hypotheses and concocting theories. All these are fictions to be judged only in terms of the history of similar writings. Yet, on the other hand, writings of the academic study of religion must also be demonstrably grounded in the reality of the subject. Without this grounding, what we do is finally not academic at all.

Notes

1. In the contemporary popular domain there are a variety of correlations with these drives, interestingly suggesting that they can and do exist independent of one another. Gender stereotypes correlate male with the formal (reason) and female with the sensuous (intuition). Personality type stereotypically identifies arts with the sensual and scientists with the formal. In journalistic terms inspired by split brain research these types are often narrowly distinguished by hemispherical brain designations: left and right brained. To me it is fascinating that, though this has been persistently recognized since at least Schiller, we have failed (in large measure) to see the inseparability of these opposing forces, that it is the interactivity that is key to human creativity and vitality.

2. There are the many memorable passages from Schiller attesting to his understanding of play. For example, "With beauty man shall only play, and it is with beauty only that he shall play ... Man only plays when he is in the full sense of the word a human being, and he is only a human being when he plays" (1967: XV.8 and 9). And, "it is precisely play and play alone, which of all man's states and conditions is the one which makes him whole and unfolds both sides of his nature at once" (1967: XV.7). Finally, the utmost that experience can achieve will consist of an oscillation between the two principles, in which now reality, now form, will predominate. Beauty as Idea, therefore, can never be other than one and indivisible, since there can never be more than one point of equilibrium; whereas beauty in experience will be eternally twofold, because oscillation can disturb the equilibrium in twofold fashion, including it now to the one side, now to the other. (1967: XVI.1)

3. More recently Charles Sanders Peirce wrote of play in a fashion similar to and dependent upon Schiller. He made explicit his connection with Schiller's understanding of play and, interestingly, the first book of philosophy he studied intensely as a teen was Schiller's On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Near the end of his life Peirce discussed play in his essay "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908). A full understanding of Peirce's views on play requires an extensive study well beyond the scope of this essay, but I believe that he identified "Pure Play" with abduction (hypothesis inference), which both precedes and encompasses the creative interplay of induction and deduction, a play that aborts yet transcends the opposition. Peirce, I believe, saw play as the creative force of discovery. See Peirce, especially 1931-58: 6.452-493.

4. Johan Huizinga's work (1970 [1939]) is of little importance to the story of play as it designates some sort of structuralism, some dynamic of certain types of structures. Huizinga sees play largely as action (contest) which might have led him to understand play as structuralism, but he was more bent on using play as an excuse to demonstrate his extensive knowledge of cultural history and to criticize modernity. For further critique of Huizinga see also Ehrmann (1968).

5. I realize how cursory is this discussion of play. While it may appear to some to be a light or trivial topic, play has a firm place in philosophy and anthropology. There is not yet: the much needed comprehensive history of the study of play which would most certainly include contributions by Gadamer (1989), Bakhtin (1981) and others, as well as much fuller consideration of those I have so summarily presented.

6. The term "strategy" is mine, J. Z. Smith simply presents them as maps, that is, map types or categories of maps. I feel it is much more consistent with the dynamic playful character of his broader study of religion to call them strategies and it reminds others of Smith's warning that these should not be used as categories by which to label religions. For a fuller discussion on this point see S. D. Gill 1998a.

7. This issue is considered in depth in S. D. Gill 1998b, especially chs. 1, 2, 7 and 8.