

Play - 2: Friedrich Schiller

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*That you are here—that life exists and identity,
That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse.*
Walt Whitman
*Man plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a human being,
and he is only fully a human being when he plays.*
Friedrich Schiller

Play is a light and easy word, the natural activity of children and animals, especially young ones. leisure and freedom, commonly opposed to work and the serious. Surprisingly long the subject of philosophers, social scientists and artists, play is also a key to the topsy turvy world of postmodernity.

In many ways Friedrich Schiller's late eighteenth century discussion of play surprisingly anticipates the mid-twentieth century views of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Gregory Bateson and the late twentieth century consideration of play by Jacques Derrida and Jean Baudrillard. Rather than presenting a thorough history of the consideration of play, given the unbearable lightness of play, I consider but several significant contributions to this history. My objective in this and the next couple of lectures is to explore these select writings/thinkers on play to expand our appreciation of the richness of play.

A curious thing happened in the course of a series of letters that Friedrich Schiller published in 1793 on the subject of aesthetic education. Well, it did not really originate with Schiller. He was influenced by Immanuel Kant and there were others before Kant. Still from my vantage, Schiller is the most notable and interesting among them. Writing about aesthetics, Schiller began with a discussion of his understanding of the fundamental drives or impulses that make up the peculiarly human character. Conflicting impulses, yet somehow each necessary. Beauty characterizes the situation in which these impulses are happily conjoined without either losing its force. But how to understand this both-that-cannot-be conjunction? This is the curious thing. Schiller wrote of this conjunction in terms of play. Furthermore, since beauty characterizes this relationship of concert,¹ he wrote of beauty also in the terms of play. Schiller, I believe, anticipates twentieth century writings on play, particularly those of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gregory Bateson, Jacques Derrida and Jean Baudrillard. And it must be remembered that Schiller's writing directly influenced Charles Sanders Pierce.

Though considered a notable work in the history of aesthetics the collection of letters known by the title *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* is rarely referenced in considerations of play. There is an occasional reference to the Letters as contributing to one of the modern theories of play. Herbert Spencer, the nineteenth century psychologist, credits Schiller as his inspiration for his discussion of

¹ Schiller does not discuss what he means by concert.

the surplus energy or exuberance theory of play. In the revised version of his *Principles of Psychology* (1870-2), Spencer cited Schiller for support, though indirectly since he could not remember his name, referring only to the influence of "a statement of a German author."² This exuberance theory has become prominent in its relevance to the modern correlation of play with leisure, in contrast with work, and with the modern sense of the value of psychological release.

The work most commonly cited since mid-twentieth century as the source or inspiration for contemporary studies of play is Johan Huizinga's *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (1944). Huizinga cites Schiller only one time. In his chapter "Play-forms in Art," he equates Schiller's *Spieltrieb*, play drive, with the human propensity to ornament, which he exemplifies by a reference to doodling.³ Huizinga gives no evidence of having read more than the Fourteenth Letter and he misrepresents Schiller.⁴

Schiller's connection of play with art was likely influenced by Kant's discussion of art in his *Critique of Judgment* (1790). In distinguishing "art" from "handicraft" Kant holds that "the First is called *free*, the other may be called *industrial art*. We look on the former as something which could only prove final (be a success) as play, i.e., an occupation which is agreeable on its own account; but on the second as labor."⁵ Art, like play, is autotelic as opposed to handicraft which works to produce something for a purpose other than the making.⁶ Kant calls upon "play" to make clear what he means by "soul" [*Geist*] in his discussion of what constitutes artistic genius. Some works of art are deserving of being called art in their demonstration of "taste," yet somehow they are "soulless." "Soul" is the animating principle in the mind. Soul is "that which sets the mental powers into a swing that is final, i.e., into a play which is self-maintaining and which strengthens those powers for such activity."⁷ In his discussion of the three divisions of the fine arts, Kant identifies one division as the "play of sensations" or the "beautiful play of sensations," by which he refers to music and the "art of color." By "play" Kant refers to "the *effect* of those vibrating movements upon the elastic parts of our body that can be evident to sense."⁸ In Kant's usage, play is "agreeable on its own account," that is, it is autotelic, and it designates a self-maintaining swing or harmony of vibrating movements. The association of play with vibrating or oscillating movement will be developed by others. Play can scarcely be imagined apart from movement.

²See Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, translators and editors, *Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of Letters* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1967), p. clxxxvi and Susanne Millar, *The Psychology of Play* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p.15.

³Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950, trans. of 1944 German edition), p. 168.

⁴Huizinga's book may be cast in a much needed critical light once the discussion of play from Schiller to Derrida has been traced.

⁵Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement* translated by J. C. Meredith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) as quoted in Mark Taylor *Deconstruction in Context*, p. 39.

⁶Schiller here anticipates Baudrillard's distinction between seduction and production.

⁷Ibid., p. 47.

⁸Ibid., p. 56.

Schiller's Aesthetic Letters argue for the importance of aesthetic education, proposing that aesthetic education is essential to the realization of human potential. Foundational to his argument is Schiller's description of the two forces or impulses that drive human action, that define the human character. Schiller describes these two opposing forces in various ways. Analyzing the age in which he lived, heavily influenced by the French Revolution, Schiller felt that culture tended to bifurcate the individual placing him or her at odds within him or herself, with detrimental results,

either as savage, when feeling predominates over principle; or as barbarian when principle destroys feeling. The savage despises Civilization, and acknowledges Nature as his sovereign mistress. The barbarian derides and dishonors Nature, but, more contemptible than the savage, as often as not continues to be the slave of his slave.(IV.6)⁹

Schiller felt that his "age is, in fact, moving along both these false roads, and has fallen prey, on the one hand, to coarseness, on the other, to enervation and perversity. From this twofold swaying it [the age] is to be brought back by means of beauty."(X.1)

These forces operate not only within culture, but within the individual in the terms of "person" and "condition," that is, the self and its determination, being and becoming, endurance and change. These forces constitute

two contrary challenges to man, the two fundamental laws of his sensuo-rational nature. The first insists upon absolute reality: he is to turn everything which is mere form into world, and make all his potentialities fully manifest. The second insists upon absolute formality: he is to destroy everything in himself which is mere world, and bring harmony into his changes. In other words, he is to externalize all that is within him, and give form to all that is outside him.(XI.9)

Schiller formalizes these forces in terms of drives or impulses: the *sensuous* drive (*sinnliche Treib*) and the *formal* drive (*Formtreib*). The *sensuous* drive proceeds from the sensual and physical aspect of human existence. It is concerned with physical place in time and space. Whenever this drive acts exclusively, one is but "a unit of quantity, an occupied moment of time"(XII.2). There is no person, no enduring form, only the moment of sensation. The *formal* drive proceeds from the rational nature and strives to set the human at liberty from the flux of change and sensation. It strives to embrace the wholeness of time and space, seeking eternity to the annulment of temporal change, of determining event. Yet, when this impulse dominates, the human entity loses individuality becoming an idea, a species. Humans are no more in time, they have become time.(XII)

Schiller holds that neither impulse is dispensable, yet both require restriction and moderation.(XIII) Indeed, one reaches perfection through

⁹All references to Schiller's letters will be made in the text referring to Letter and paragraph. The source is *Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of man in a Series of Letters*, edited and translated by E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1967).

a reciprocal action between the two drives, reciprocal action of such a kind that the activity of the one both gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the other, and in which each in itself achieves its highest manifestation precisely by reason of the other being active.(XIV.1)

One cannot achieve this fullness so long as only one of these two impulses is exclusively satisfied or both alternately. Schiller argues that one gains a "complete intuition of his human nature," a "vision [that] would serve him as a symbol of his accomplished destiny," when these drives are conjoined in a third drive, that is, an experience in which "he were to be at once conscious of his freedom and sensible of his existence, were, at one and the same time, to feel himself matter and come to know himself as mind."(XIV.2)

Remarkably, in his attempt to give clarity to this combination of impulses, Schiller turns to the language of play, calling it "that drive . . . in which both the others work in concert"(XIV.3) the "play drive (*spieltrieb*)," begging his reader patience with the term until he might justify its appropriateness. This third drive is

directed towards annulling time within time, reconciling becoming with absolute being and change with identity. ... The play-drive, in consequence, as the one in which both the others act in concert, will exert upon the psyche at once a moral and a physical constraint; it will, therefore, since it annuls all contingency, annul all constraint too, and set man free both physically and morally.(XIV.3 and 5)

Whereas the object of the sense drive is "life" and the object of the form drive is "form," the object of the play drive, to Schiller's understanding, is "living form," a concept that denotes aesthetic qualities, that is, "Beauty."¹⁰ Living form, beauty, is the consummation of humanity. He pronounces: "With beauty man shall only play, and it is with beauty only that he shall play. ... Man only plays when he is in the full sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays."(XV.8 and 9)

Why "play"? By using the term play, does not Schiller risk trivializing both human perfection and aesthetic qualities? What is there of play that helps Schiller communicate these central concerns? He holds that his use of the word is fully warranted in terms of its usage in common speech, where play denotes "everything which is neither subjectively nor objectively contingent, and yet imposes no kind of constraint either from within or from without."(XV.5) In other words, Schiller appeals to the usage of the word play in common speech, where he holds that it is understood neither as a state of mind nor as class of objects,¹¹ where it is understood to be engaged without goal or necessity, that is, play contains its own satisfaction. Schiller, it seems, was not advancing a new theory of play, he was not advancing a theory of play at all. He was merely relying on what he considered common knowledge and experience of play.

¹⁰Reminiscent of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's "lived body" and his rejection of a simple mind/body duality.

¹¹ Anticipating Merleau-Ponty's distinction of the interdependence of the visible and the invisible.

Schiller avoids the trap of so many modern understandings of play by appealing to a common understanding that it is neither subjective nor objective, that is, play is not distinguished as state of mind or attitude, nor as a particular set of actions or objects. By calling it a drive or impulse, but even more by describing play as a certain kind of interaction among other drives or impulses, Schiller moves play to the level of the description of relationships between and principles of interaction among other things—here the formal and sensuous drives.

Taking inspiration from Schiller, we may suggest that play refers to the principles or grammars that characterize structures, a set of structuring principles, a metastructure. This is, I believe, what Derrida refers to as "structurality."¹² Play denotes the principles in which structural oppositions, even structural anomalies, may at once be held together without reconciliation or reduction. It is not the simple alternation of taking turns, but a momentary focus on one structural element that reveals the power and dynamics of the opposing elements. Schiller thought of it in the dynamic terms of reciprocity and oscillation, even vibration.

A mere game may be thought of as a set of relationships and activities prescribed by a set of rules, often including the designation of a space and the definition of an objective. Games, in general, may be designated as a particular kind of activity. But one may also think of game as the designation of a state of mind, a mental strategy, or an attitude. The word "game" is sometimes even used as a verb, as in such phrases as "to game a situation," though I think it a remarkably inelegant one. The play of a game is a result of a grammar of interaction as specified in the terms of rules and objectives. Common to the rules of a game is a description of "the play." A game "in play" subjugates its goal or objective to the holding together of opposing forces, an oscillation or back and forth movement among them, without resolution. There is no play when this principle fails or ceases to be operative; at that point the play of the game is over. Play is not game; game is not play. Game is played. There is the play of the game.

Considering game in terms of Schiller's form and sense drives, the rules to a game are at one polar position in this continuum. Here there is no play, only the potential for play. At the opposite pole, there are no rules, no boundaries, no definition, and therefore no game. Game play arises in the oscillating interaction between these poles.

A further clarification can be made here of Schiller's formal and sensuous drives. The rules and procedures that define a game may be thought of as their formal dimension while the raw physical actions of the game, its sensual dimension. The play of the game is achieved in the way that the rules both make possible, yet restrict, the sensual aspect of the game, that is, the range of allowable raw physical action, while at the same time, the physical actions (the sensual drive) give life and application to the rules. There is no play of the game if either the formal or sensual dimensions is missing.

¹²The word "structurality" is an abstract noun denoting the state, condition, or quality of having the character of structure. Having come to believe that play is not best understood as a thing, experience, state of mind, or kind of activity but rather as a particular kind of condition of a thing, an experience, a state of mind, or activity, it requires this peculiar sort of nondesignation.

While mere games are played; they are not the exclusive domain of play and this begins to reveal our interest in understanding dancing in terms of play. This is what Schiller acknowledged in his use of the term play to identify the third drive. We see the characteristics of play echoed in the phrasing by which Schiller elaborated the play impulse.

the play-drive, in consequence, as the one in which both the others act in concert, will exert upon the psyche at once a moral and a physical constraint;(XIV.5)

it is precisely play and play alone, which of all men's states and conditions is the one which makes him whole and unfolds both sides of his nature at once;(XV.7)

the utmost that experience can achieve will consist of an oscillation between the two principles, in which now reality, now form, will predominate. Beauty as Idea, therefore, can never be other than one and indivisible, since there can never be more than one point of equilibrium; whereas beauty in experience will be eternally twofold, because oscillation can disturb the equilibrium in twofold fashion, including it now to the one side, now to the other.(XVI.1)

Schiller argued that when the sense and form impulses are interrelated/integrated in play, at least the idea of human perfection—the aesthetic—may emerge though not as the direct object. The whole series of letters is intent on showing that, through the playful engagement of the conflicting and potentially destructive impulses, human beings achieve their potential. Hence, "With beauty man shall only play, and it is with beauty only that he shall play."

Understood in this way, Schiller, parting from Kant's view, does not base the aesthetic in the subjective. The aesthetic is articulated in terms of being "neither subjectively nor objectively contingent." Beauty, the exemplum of play engaged in the domain of human potentiality, is neither a state of mind nor a class of objects. However, as Anthony Savile shows,¹³ Schiller discussed beauty primarily in terms of the achievement of the ideal human state and, by extension, that of society and the world. Beauty is necessary to the achievement of this state and characterizes its manifestations. Because of this concern with human ideals and his discussion of human impulses there is the general, but, I believe, incorrect, impression that Schiller held the aesthetic to be subjectively based.¹⁴

It must be asked whether there is any basis in Schiller's work for an exuberance theory of play. In the final letter in this collection, Schiller considers the universality of the aesthetic ideas he has presented, the possible perfection not only of individuals, but of societies and of the universe. Schiller considers the presence of play structurality in the natural world that is apart from humankind. In one respect he is considering the question of the play of the world. He notes that "Nature has given even to creatures without reason more than the bare necessities of existence, and

¹³Anthony Savile, *Aesthetic Reconstructions: The Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), Chapters 7 & 8.

¹⁴Hans-Georg Gadamer held a similar view as will be discussed below.

shed a glimmer of freedom even into the darkness of animal life."(XXVII.3) For example the lion, when "not gnawed by hunger . . . fills the echoing desert with a roaring that speaks defiance, and his exuberant energy enjoys itself in purposeless display."(XXVII.3) He sees the same spirit of joyousness expressed in the swarm of insects in the sunlight and in the melodious warbling of song birds. Here in nature there is freedom apart from necessity, apart from external need.

An animal may be said to be at work, when the stimulus to activity is some lack; it may be said to be at play, when the stimulus is sheer plenitude of vitality, when superabundance of life is its own incentive to action. Even inanimate nature exhibits a similar luxuriance of forces, coupled with a laxity of determination which, in that material sense, might well be called play. ... Thus does Nature, even in her material kingdom, offer us a prelude of the illimitable, and even here remove in part the chains which, in the realm of form, she casts away entirely. From the compulsion of want, or physical earnestness, she makes the transition via the compulsion of superfluity, or physical play, to aesthetic play; and before she soars, in the sublime freedom of beauty, beyond the fetters of ends and purposes altogether, she makes some approach to this independence, at least from afar, in that kind of free activity which is at once its own end and its own means.(XXVII.3)

Though, like Kant, Schiller opposes work and play, he describes an aesthetic hierarchy based essentially on the common presence of play. The expression of exuberance, the actions not accountable by any outward or inward necessity, is the product of play and thereby is linked, both hierarchically and developmentally, with the aesthetic in the human realm. It is quite in contrast to Schiller's stated understanding of play to credit him with a theory of play in which otherwise inexplicable actions and expressions—lion roars, bird warbles, insect swarms and a host of human actions—are thought to arise to meet the need to express exuberance or overabundance, for this is a need-based theory focused on a particular class of objects. To acknowledge that Schiller's advance was to identify play as metastructure¹⁵ and to designate it as "neither subjectively nor objectively contingent, and yet imposes neither outward nor inward necessity" clarifies his aesthetics, and establishes a perspective on play that, while heretofore not adequately acknowledged, has played a role in the development of modern thought.

The translators of Schiller's letters had this to say about his style of writing and presentation.

He [Schiller] takes his reader by the hand and leads him around and around, bringing him now up against a deadlock which will not be resolved until he reaches a different point on the same or on another circle, now to a solution which, as he moves still further round will reveal within itself problems of even greater complexity. He thus leaves him at the end with an impression, not only of a myriad-faceted problem, but of the multi-dimensionality of the solution he is offering.¹⁶

¹⁵He anticipates Bateson's discussion of playing containing the metamessage "this is play."

¹⁶Wilkinson and Willoughby, p. lvi.

Schiller's Aesthetic Letters have an iterative structure, their form corresponding with their theme, their author artfully engaged in the play of substitution.¹⁷ Substituting one set of terms for the previous set, in supplementarity, Schiller moves from a concern for individual human potential all the way to the fulfillment of cultural potential in an Aesthetic State. He uses some terms like *Natur* in many ways.¹⁸ He uses many terms for the same referent—eight, for example, to refer to God.¹⁹ Antithesis is preferred to synthesis. His translators proclaim dance as

the most apposite of all metaphors for the form of his treatise. Not just for the rhythms of his periods . . . but for the philosophic and aesthetic complexity of the form as a whole. Partly because the manifest tautology of dance is a paradigm of the essential tautology of all art: of its inherent tendency to offer a hundred different treatments of the same subject, to find a thousand different forms of expression for the thoughts and feelings common to all men.²⁰

The Aesthetic Letters have a structure based on threes. Not only does Schiller reiterate the same concerns almost exactly every three letters, in each of these iterations the Letters demand a "third thing": a "third character" combining the virtues of both the animal and rational sides of human nature (Letter III); the clarification that the "third character" will differ from the Greek notions of wholeness and harmony (Letter VI); the call for a third term to resolve the dilemma that, to Schiller, characterizes human nature (Letter IX); the argument for the "third drive" conjoining the heterogeneous form and sense drives (Letter XII); beauty is identified with the third drive (Letter XV); a "middle condition" between activity and passivity, combining the advantages of each, is proposed (Letter XVIII); the aesthetic mode of the psyche, the "third state," is defined (Letter XXI); a description of the "third state" to which both individuals and cultures must pass, each moving through a three stage cycle, to achieve full potential (Letter XXIV); and, finally, all the "third things" come together in Schiller's conception of a "Third State," an "Aesthetic State," which fulfills all the previous ideals.²¹

In all of these domains, the "third thing" arises as the interplay of two others. The "third thing" is that which conjoins, with vitality but without synthesis, two heterogeneous, even opposing, structural elements. The "third thing" is always double-faced; at once a warning of the dangers of collapsing or diminishing complexity and a demonstration of the dynamism and vitality of the structural dynamic the "third thing" makes possible.

¹⁷"The play of substitution" has been used to describe Schiller's style and structure. Wilkinson and Willoughby indicate their preference for the term "tautology" in the attempt to counteract what they see as the tendency others have had to make too much of some ponderousness of Schiller's style. It seems to me that their reticence to use the term "play" is consistent throughout the work with their basic misunderstanding of it. They tend to equate play with the light, the trivial, even in contrast with Schiller's much more complex understanding.

¹⁸See Wilkinson and Willoughby, pp. 322-6.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. cxxii.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. lvi. And, of course, this metaphor is especially appropriate since the original meaning of *Speil*, as Gadamer reminds us, is dance. It is also notable that Schiller wrote a poem titled "The Dance." I see dancing as an important exemplar of the structurality of play. See my "Dancing as Making" 2009 www.Sam-Gill.com.

²¹This structure is the observation of Wilkinson and Willoughby who describe it, p. li.

It is the cross connection of two heterogeneous structures that Schiller presents both in substance and in structure in the Aesthetic Letters. His favorite rhetorical figure is chiasm: the rhetorical inversion of the second of two parallel phrases, clauses, and so on.²²

Schiller's paradigmatic play chiasm is: (put positively) the form drive achieves its fulfillment only through the sense drive, the sense drive through the form drive; (put negatively) without the sense drive the form drive runs amiss, the sense drive runs amiss without the form drive. The chiasm is redoubled, but not double-crossed: the chiasm that conjoins the form and sense drives is the play drive; chiasm is itself a "third thing," an illustration of play.

Sheinen, as discussed by Schiller, has two distinct, even opposing, meanings: "to shine" and "to appear or seem." In some usages they are synonymous or at least closely related. In senses related to light, for example, things appear as they shine or are shined upon. But the second sense of the word holds the key to the ambiguity, for there are multiple senses of "to appear or seem." A thing may appear to be what it in fact is, but it may seem to be what it is not. *Shein* may be identified with both *Erscheinung*, "appearance," and *Tauschung*, "deception."²³ Schiller's use of *Shein* in his discussion of aesthetics anticipates, and may serve as a critique of, Gadamer's conception of "mimesis." The peculiarity of the term, which seems to differ from itself (or, to maintain consistent language, to shine upon its appearances) is in the spirit of and anticipates Derrida's "différance." Further, *Shein* cannot be adequately understood apart from "play," nor perhaps "play" apart from *Shein*. Chiasm.²⁴

By this point in the Aesthetic Letters the discussion has shifted to the achievement of the full potentiality of the human species. Striving for "aesthetic semblance" is, for Schiller, a key to human advancement, since it

demands higher powers of abstraction, greater freedom of heart, more energy of will, than man ever needs when he confines himself to reality; and he must have already left this reality behind if he would arrive at that kind of semblance.(XXVI.1)

Before the rise of semblance, Schiller argues, humankind is chained to a brute material existence. The emergence of semblance is an advancement because it marks the rise of human invention, the abstraction of the ideal from the brute reality of nature, of form from substance. Semblance is wholly the work of humankind and exists only in the realm of ideas and forms. "Aesthetic semblance" (or variously "autonomous semblance" or "pure semblance") is based on maintaining a clear distinction between "semblance" and "actuality" and "truth." It "neither seeks to represent reality nor needs to be represented by it."(XXVI.13) "Logical semblance" in contrast, is confused with actuality and truth. It is mere deception.

²²His use of chiasmus is discussed in Wilkinson and Willoughby, pp. lxxviii-lxx and in Elizabeth M. Wilkinson, "Reflections After Translating Schiller's *Letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man*," in *Schiller Bicentenary Lecture*, edited by F. Norman, (London: University of London Institute of Germanic Languages and Literatures, 1960), pp. 63-66. It should be read with Merleau-Ponty's and Bateson's separate discussions of chiasm.

²³See the discussion of *Shien* in Wilkinson and Willoughby, pp. 327-9.

²⁴This consideration of chiasm anticipates Merleau-Ponty's "flesh ontology."

Aesthetic semblance is key to the rise of art, to the aesthetic perspective, to human development. Where it exists "we shall see actual life governed by the ideal, honor triumphant over possessions, thought over enjoyment, dreams of immortality over existence."(XXVI.12)

"Play" is supplementary to "aesthetic semblance." In distinguishing aesthetic from logical semblance Schiller wrote, "Only the first is play, the later is deception."(XXVI.5) He held that the play drive begins to stir at the stage of development when it becomes important to distinguish semblance from reality, form from body. (XXVI.7) What I believe he means is that there can be no play when the sense drive alone is operative, when, in his conception, human beings were at the stage of unreflective brute material sensuality. There is no play in a single pole structure for it functions as a center which takes the play out of the structure. "Aesthetic semblance" is one of the ways that Schiller expresses the importance of play. The structural dynamics of the meanings of *Shein* are an illustration, an exemplum, of the structural dynamics of play.

Truth is never endangered by attaching value to semblance, because the clear distinction of semblance and reality prevents any danger of substituting semblance for truth. Though Schiller warns that "it sometimes happens that intelligence will carry its zeal for reality to such a pitch of intolerance, that it pronounces a disparaging judgment upon the whole art of aesthetic semblance just because it is semblance."(XXVI.5)²⁵

²⁵ This suggests a relation to the distinction of *trompe l'oeil* (see Baudrillard's discussion in *Seduction*) and to the "reality" model for film.